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Abstract
Rapid, accurate assessment of the yield of a large-scale urban explosion will assist in implementing emergency response plans,
will facilitate better estimates of areas at risk of high damage and casualties, and will provide policy makers and the public
with more accurate information about the event. On 4 August 2020, an explosion occurred in the Port of Beirut, Lebanon.
Shortly afterwards, a number of videos were posted to social media showing the moment of detonation and propagation of the
resulting blast wave. In this article, we present a method to rapidly calculate explosive yield based on analysis of 16 videos
with a clear line-of-sight to the explosion. The time of arrival of the blast is estimated at 38 distinct positions, and the results
are correlated with well-known empirical laws in order to estimate explosive yield. The best estimate and reasonable upper
limit of the 2020 Beirut explosion determined from this method are 0.50 kt TNT and 1.12 kt TNT, respectively.
Keywords Beirut explosion · Blast · Social media · Time of arrival · Yield estimation
1 Introduction
On 4 August 2020, a series of explosions occurred in the Port
of Beirut, Lebanon, widely reported to have been caused by
detonation of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate (approxi-
mately 2750 tonnes) following a fire in the warehouse where
it was being stored. The final and largest explosion caused
considerable damage to the surrounding area and at the time
of writing resulted in at least 181 deaths and over 6000
injuries.
Shortly after the explosion, social media users began
sharing videos showing the initial fire, detonation, and prop-
agating blast wave. In many of these videos, the moment
of detonation and blast wave time of arrival (ta) at the
observer’s position and/or recognisable landmarks are clearly
discernible from the footage and audio. Thus, these videos
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make it possible to approximately determine the time of
arrival of the shock front at different distances from the source
of the explosion.
In this article, we examine 16 videos posted online
[1–16]1 at various locations across the city of Beirut (Fig. 1).
We correlate the calculated distance–time relationship with
well-known semi-empirical laws [17] in order to estimate
the approximate yield of the 2020 Beirut explosion by
minimising the mean absolute error between the data and
semi-empirical predictions.
There is a pressing need for rapid, accurate assessment of
the size of the explosive yield in such events, both to inform
first responders of the likely injuries and structural damage at
various distances from the explosion and to provide a factual
context for political and media discussion.
2 Determination of arrival time from video
footage
The videos we analysed in this article were selected having
met the following criteria:
1 We have attempted to reference a reputable secondary source for those
videos where we could not identify the original source.
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Fig. 1 Filming locations of the 16 videos [1–16] used to estimate the yield of the 2020 Beirut explosion. Satellite imagery from Google Earth
(January 2020)
– Direct line-of-sight from the filming location to the
source of the explosion in order to determine the moment
of detonation2, as shown in Fig. 2. This was taken as the
start of the frame in which the flash was first visible;
– Identifiable location;
– Synchronised audio and video;
– Filming began before the moment of detonation and con-
tinued until after arrival of the blast wave.3
The approximate positioning of each video was deter-
mined by cross-referencing recognisable buildings and road
configurations with Google Street View and satellite images
from Google Earth. The distance from the point of detonation
(assumed to be the centre of the warehouse) was calculated
using the “measure distance” feature in Google Earth. This
was taken as the “map distance” rather than “ground dis-
tance” (which accounts for changes in elevation) as the height
of the filming location was unknown. Owing to uncertainties
associated with determining the exact filming location, we
present a “best estimate” value as well as a “reasonable upper
limit” for each distance (Table 1). Note: videos filmed from
a high-rise building have a higher uncertainty in position due
2 In some videos [11,12,14,16], the detonation itself was obscured by
neighbouring buildings but could be identified as a clear flash in the
images.
3 Video [15] began slightly after detonation, and the time of detonation
was estimated by examining the size of the fireball in the first few frames
and back extrapolating.
to parallax in the satellite images. All distances are measured
at street level.
In total, 38 data points were collected from analysis of
the social media footage. Three techniques were used for
determining time of arrival:
1. Audio In all 16 videos, the arrival of the blast wave could
be identified, either as a clear, sharp increase in ampli-
tude of the audio signal (Fig. 2), or by examining the
video frame-by-frame for those with higher levels of back-
ground noise.
2. Visual In eight videos, the arrival of the blast wave at
identifiable intermediate locations was determined by
inspecting the video frame-by-frame (15 data points),
again see Fig. 2.
3. Fireball In five videos, the size of the detonation product
fireball was estimated for a small number of frames after
detonation using the nearby grain silo to calibrate the scale
of the images. This provided seven additional close-in data
points to supplement the distance–time relationship.
Figure 2 shows, as an example, how three arrival times
were determined from [5]. The two Visual data points cor-
respond to the time at which the blast was judged to have
reached the buildings on the right-hand side and left-hand
side of the frame, respectively (506 m and 586 m from the
source). The Audio data point was taken as the time to the
first local peak in the audio signal. Table 1 provides a sum-
mary of the diagnostic techniques used for each video. Again,
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Time of arrival at building on
right side of frame: 0.959 s, 506 m
Time of arrival at building on
left side of frame: 1.091 s, 586 m
Time of arrival: 1.276 s, 630 m
Time from detonation (s)
Fig. 2 Example of Visual (top) and Audio (bottom) diagnostics used to determine time of arrival at various locations in video [5]. Note: video stills
have been cropped to aid clarity of presentation
we present a best estimate and reasonable upper limit on the
arrival times calculated using these methods. The associated
timing error was specified as one frame for the Audio method
and two frames for Visual and Fireball methods. The frame
rate of the videos varied between 24 and 30 fps, with result-
ing minimum and maximum errors of 0.033 s (1/30 s) and
0.083 s (2/24 s), respectively.
3 Estimation of yield from distance–time
relationship
Kingery and Bulmash [17] present semi-empirical relation-
ships between scaled time of arrival, ta/W
1/3, and scaled
distance, Z = R/W 1/3, where R is the distance from the
source (in m) and W is the TNT-equivalent mass of the
explosive (in kg). The relationships were derived from the
compilation of a large number of experiments which used
hemispheres of TNT between 1 and 400,000 kg, detonated
on the ground surface and allowed to propagate unobstructed
through free air. We present a simplified polylogarithmic
function derived by the current authors from the data pre-
sented in [17],4 with ta in ms:
4 Coefficient of determination: 0.999, valid for 0.0674 ≤ Z ≤
40.0 m/kg1/3.
log(ta/W
1/3) = 0.0717(log Z)5 − 0.0567(log Z)4
−0.3192(log Z)3 + 0.1495(log Z)2
+1.8165 log Z − 0.3215. (1)
Equation (1) was solved for W = 0.01−10 kt TNT in
increments of 0.01 kt.5 For each fit, the mean absolute error
(MAE) was calculated, with the predicted yield given as
the charge mass at the minimum MAE. To allow for direct
comparison with the semi-empirical predictions, we have
assumed that the explosives were formed into a hemisphere6
and that attenuation of the blast wave by the urban environ-
ment was negligible. The regression analysis was performed
twice: once with the unmodified data (to find the best esti-
mate) and once with the positioning error added to location
(including a 10 m provision for uncertainty in determining
the true detonation location) and timing error subtracted from
the recorded arrival time, in order to find the reasonable upper
limit.
5 A constant velocity of 350.7 m/s was assumed for Z ≥ 18.0 m/kg1/3
based on reported air temperature and relative humidity of 30◦C and
66%, respectively, at the time of the explosion. Ambient temper-
ature was assumed to have a negligible effect on arrival time for
Z < 18.0 m/kg1/3.
6 This is reasonable, given the approximately hemispherical shape of
the fireball shortly after detonation.
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Table 1 Summary of videos
analysed and diagnostic
techniques used for each
References Distance to source (m) Diagnostics
Best estimate Reasonable upper limit Audio Visual Fireball
[1] 85 +10 
[2] 563 +10  
[3] 566 +30 
[4] 572 +10   
[5] 630 +30  
[6] 675 +30  
[7] 690 +10  
[8] 1000 +40  
[9] 1074 +15 
[10] 1120 +20  
[11] 1141 +10  
[12] 1153 +10   
[13] 1380 +20  
[14] 1605 +10 
[15] 1995 +40 
[16] 2380 +10  
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Fig. 3 Collated time of arrival vs distance from analysis of social media
video footage, with the best estimate (0.50 kt TNT) and reasonable upper
limit (1.12 kt TNT) curves determined from regression analysis. Also
shown are curves for 0.01, 0.1, and 10 kt TNT for reference. Note: error
bars are not distinguishable at this scale
Figure 3 shows the compiled data extracted from social
media video footage (the radius-time data are also provided
as electronic supplementary material) as well as the best esti-
mate (0.50 kt TNT) and reasonable upper limit (1.12 kt TNT)
curves determined from the regression analysis. These agree
remarkably well with the 0.5–1.1 kt range determined from
analysis of infrasonic, hydroacoustic, and seismic signals
[18]. Also shown are curves for 0.01, 0.1, and 10 kt TNT
to show the effect of order-of-magnitude variations in explo-
sive yield on time of arrival. The Audio and Visual data points
broadly follow the same trend line, which gives confidence
in both approaches.
4 Closing remarks
This article presents a method for rapidly determining explo-
sive yield. Here, we extracted time of arrival data from
careful examination of video footage uploaded to social
media shortly after the 2020 Beirut blast. Despite the videos
originating from a range of sources and being located at
various points across the city, the resulting distance–time
relationship shows a clear trend and is well represented by
established semi-empirical predictions for 0.50 kt TNT. In
order to account for the uncertainties associated with deter-
mining precise locations and timings, the results have also
been analysed by taking a reasonable upper limit, which is
well represented by semi-empirical predictions for 1.12 kt
TNT.
Our initial estimates of explosive yield were 1.0–1.5 kt
TNT [19], based on preliminary analysis of the available
footage at the time. It was subsequently discovered that some
of these videos dropped frames when transferring to or from
social media. As more video footage became available, we
were able to perform more accurate blast yield predictions
with an improved error estimation. This demonstrates the
importance of understanding and quantifying sources of error
and uncertainty, particularly when considering data with rel-
atively low precision.
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